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ABSTRACT
Being able to check whether an online advertisement has
been targeted is essential for resolving privacy controversies
and implementing in practice data protection regulations like
GDPR, CCPA, and COPPA. In this paper we describe the de-
sign, implementation, and deployment of an advertisement
auditing system called eyeWnder that uses crowdsourcing
to reveal in real time whether a display advertisement has
been targeted or not. Crowdsourcing simplifies the detection
of targeted advertising, but requires reporting to a central
repository the impressions seen by different users, thereby
jeopardizing their privacy. We break this deadlock with a
privacy preserving data sharing protocol that allows eyeWn-
der to compute global statistics required to detect targeting,
while keeping the advertisements seen by individual users
and their browsing history private. We conduct a simulation
study to explore the effect of different parameters and a live
validation to demonstrate the accuracy of our approach. Un-
like previous solutions, eyeWnder can even detect indirect
targeting, i.e., marketing campaigns that promote a product
or service whose description bears no semantic overlap with
its targeted audience.
1 INTRODUCTION
Targeted advertising offers the possibility of delivering tai-
lored advertisements (in the following ads) to users based on
their interests and demographic properties. It has helped the
advertising industry reach high growth rates and revenues
(23.2% growth and $23.9B in Q1 ’18 in US only) [13], has
created lots of jobs, subsidized the delivery of free services,
and funded a lot of digital innovation. Of course, to deliver
targeted ads, so-called AdTech companies need to detect
users’ interests and intentions which is done by monitoring
visited pages, searched terms, social network activity, etc.
In its principle, the concept of targeted (or personalized)
advertising appears benign: offering to consumers products
and services that they truly care about, instead of irrelevant
ones that distract or annoy. It is in its implementation and
actual use where controversies start arising. For example,
tracking should respect fundamental data protection rights of
people, such as their desire to opt-out, and should keep clear
from sensitive personal-data categories, such as health, polit-
ical beliefs, religion or sexual orientation, protected by data
protection laws like GDPR [23] in Europe and the California
Consumers Privacy Act (CCPA) [52] in US. Similarly, sensi-
tive demographic groups, like children, should be protected
from data collection and targeting as mandated, for example,
by FTC’s COPPA [1] regulation in US. Unfortunately, this is
not always the case, as made evident by the continuous pres-
ence of the topic in the news and public debates [12, 49], or
the conducted investigations and placed fines [50]. A direct
consequence of concern around privacy is the rise in popu-
larity of anti-tracking and ad-blocking tools [2, 3, 22, 28, 44].
This surge of software can choke the web of its advertising
revenues. To avoid a Tragedy of the Commons triggered by
eroding privacy [37], companies offering web services need
to gain back the trust of their users. An important step in this
direction would be to provide users with the ability to single
out and report ads that violate privacy norms and laws.
The networking, measurements, and distributed systems
community has been active in the development of a new
breed of transparency tools [37] for end users, data pro-
tection authorities, and the advertising sector’s own self-
regulation initiatives. Initial efforts went to detecting online
price discrimination [30, 31, 42, 43] followed by tools for
detecting targeted advertising [16, 38–40, 46, 54]. Having the
ability to verify the deja vu feeling arising when running
into seemingly familiar offerings is important for user em-
powerment and goes beyond mere curiosity. For example, it
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can allow a user to check whether marketers have respected
his opt-out signals, expressed through Do-Not-Track [21],
AdChoices [4], or any of the numerous self-regulation ini-
tiatives put forth by the advertising sector. Moreover, if a
user runs into an ad related to sensitive, and hence protected,
data category, he should be able to verify whether this has
been targeted, or is appearing for other reasons. The latter
is not always trivial, as with the so called "re-targeted" ads
displaying products and services visited by the user in the
recent past. Behavioral targeting can be more general and,
for example, display to a user a pair of sneakers of brand
B’ at store S’ because the user viewed a pair of sneakers of
brand B at store S. A pair of jeans may then be displayed due
to the previously viewed sneakers. Detecting such indirect
targeting quickly becomes a guessing game, and is, there-
fore, of little use to the monitoring and enforcement of data
protection laws.
Earlywork on detecting targeting has employed artificially
created “personas”, i.e., browsers scripted to visit certain
pages that allude to clear demographic types [9, 16, 38, 39],
as “bait” for measuring whether ad delivery channels target
these demographic types. In the “offline” version of the same
approach, researchers have looked at passively collected web
click-streams to detect correlations between the pages visited
by real users and the ads delivered to them [7, 40, 55]. While
these studies have made important contributions, in general,
they have been designed to operate offline, at a low scale, or
using simulated personas. In this paper, we aim at addressing
the following question: “Can we detect ad targeting with real
users, in real time, and at large scale?”
Our contributions: In this paper, we propose a novel, scal-
able, and real-time ad detection approach, and implement it
on real user’s devices. Instead of using “personas” and auto-
mated bots to collect ads from artificial visits to pages, we
rely on a custom protocol for collecting statistics about the
actual ads encountered by real users while browsing online.
We show that a surprisingly simple count-based heuristic can
detect targeting with high precision. This simple heuristic is
based on the observation that targeted ads tend to “follow”
specific users across multiple domains, while being seen by
relatively fewer users than non-targeted ones. The heuris-
tic can be computed in real-time and in a scalable fashion.
Furthermore, it is agnostic to how users’ information was
collected, and to how impressions were auctioned and deliv-
ered. This “black box” approach only looks for correlations
between users and advertisements, and is, thus, robust to
detection countermeasures [8]. Evading it, would require
eliminating such correlations, which goes against the spirit
and the essence of targeted advertising.
Crowdsourcing is a powerful tool for detecting targeted
ads, but requires users to report the ads they encounter
in different websites. The second technical contribution of
our work is a protocol for exchanging this information in a
privacy-preserving manner. We leverage a wealth of previ-
ous work on privacy-preserving aggregate statistic compu-
tation [18, 36, 41], to compute aggregate statistics required
by the ad detection algorithm, while keeping the ads seen
by users1 and their browsing history private. In particular,
we design a privacy-preserving protocol to compute distri-
bution of ads seen by users. Different from previous work in
this area, we face the challenge of protecting not only the
distribution of the ads, but the ads themselves. This problem
was recently framed by [25] as the problem of estimating
“unknown unknowns”. The techniques presented in [25] are
based on differential privacy and require clients to report
their “real” distribution as well as distributions computed
using n-grams of the labels (in our case, ad URLs). As such,
their technique fits scenarios where labels are short and not
random. We take a different approach and propose a tech-
nique that is less involved and works with any label size.
We have implemented our count-based heuristic and the
privacy-preserving protocol to support it in a distributed
system that we call eyeWnder. The third contribution of our
work is the deployment, validation, and measurement study
executed using eyeWnder.
Our findings: We have been operating eyeWnder live for
more than one year with close to 1000 users in order to
get feedback on matters of user experience and desired fea-
tures. This user base includes 100 paid volunteers from Fig-
ureEight [26] who have agreed to lend their data to our
validation efforts. We have also conducted extensive simula-
tion studies in which we could control how advertisements
are displayed. Our findings are as follows:
- Our simulations show that it only takes 6 to 7 repetitions of
an ad to make it detectable by eyeWnder. Even with such low
repetition frequency, our algorithm achieves a false negative
rate of less than 30%. Tuning the algorithm can bring the
false negative rate to below 10%, at the expense of requiring
around 5 more repetitions. More importantly, false positives,
i.e., non-targeted ads classified as targeted, are typically close
to zero, and reach up to 2% only in the most extreme corner
scenario that we have evaluated. Having very low false posi-
tives means that when eyeWnder classifies an ad as targeted,
then it most probably is. This is fundamental, if the tool is to
be used for reporting suspected data protection violations.
- The above simulations are aligned with the results from our
live validation with real users and advertising campaigns
that are not under our control. Count-based ad detection,
even with as few as 100 users, yields high precision, with true
positive and true negative rates of 78% and 87%, respectively.
- Privacy-preserving crowdsourcing allows to compute the
aggregate statistics required by the ad detection mechanism
1Note that targeted ads can reveal user interests [17].
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while keeping user browsing history and received ads private.
In particular, the privacy-preserving protocol has a negligible
effect on the quality of the computed statistics.
- We have detected several examples of indirect targeting
that existing content-based techniques (i.e., semantic overlap
between the user profile and the received ad) are unable to
detect, as well as signs of advertising bias towards different
demographic traits.
- We make available our plugin via the Chrome Store, for
wide testing and use from end-users, privacy researchers and
auditors2.
2 BACKGROUND AND REQUIREMENTS
2.1 Types of online ads
In the rest of the paper, we will refer to ads as either targeted
or non-targeted. Furthermore, we will distinguish targeted
ads between Directly- and Indirectly-targeted ads.
Targeted vs. Non-targeted ads: Targeted ads are selected
based on data about the user visiting a website. The exact
algorithms used are trade secrets of the different AdTech
companies but it is widely accepted that such algorithms
rely upon user demographic information (gender and age),
geo-location information (GPS coordinates, IP address or
Base-station id), behavioral information extracted from user
online activity (websites visited, searched terms, social net-
work activity, etc.). The form of targeted advertising based
on behavioral attributes is referred to as Online Behavioral
Advertising (OBA) whereas ads regarding a previously vis-
ited webpage offering products or services (e.g., a website
offering hotels) is referred to as Retargeting [9].
Non-Targeted ads are shown irrespectively of the user visiting
the website. This class of ads includes static ads (shown to
all users visiting a website based on a private deal between
advertisers and publishers), as well as contextual ads (ads
matching the context/topic of the website, e.g., a sports ad
appearing on a sports website).
Direct vs. Indirect targeting: Direct targeting is the most
obvious form of targeting. In this case, an advertiser inter-
ested in selling products of a certain category (e.g., fishing
products) targets users tagged as interested in such category
(i.e., fishing). Most of previous work has focused on analyzing
this type of targeting [16, 38, 39].
Indirect targeting is applied when marketers may target a
certain group of users with offerings that have no direct se-
mantic overlap with the category this group has been tagged
with. For instance, it has been reported that fans of the Walk-
ing Dead TV series were targeted with pro Donald Trump
material [11]. This would be an example of indirect targeting,
since the targeted user group (Walking Dead fans) has no
immediate semantic overlap with the advertised offering. To
2http://www.eyewnder.com/views/index
the best of our knowledge, eyeWnder is the first proposal
that tackles indirectly targeted ads.
2.2 Requirements
Next, we enumerate the most important requirements of
a system for real-time detection of targeted ads. Such re-
quirements have emerged from reviewing the limitation of
existing approaches found in the literature. In Section 9 and
Table 3 we provide an extensive comparison between our
solution and existing proposals.
Generality: The detection mechanism should be able to an-
alyze any web-based display ad. It should not be limited
to a specific ecosystem (e.g., Facebook advertising) where
more information about the user or the ad may be available,
or platform (e.g., AdChoices initiative [4]). Moreover, detec-
tion should work independently of the tracking mechanisms
used for collecting user data, interests, and intentions (be
it via cookies, browser fingerprinting, or user contributed
information such as searches or social network activity).
Precision: The mechanism should allow untrained users for
auditing, and potentially reporting, offending ads. Therefore
it is essential to have a high detection precision in terms
of True Positives (TP) and True Negatives (TN). Validation
should be carried out using publicly available data, i.e., with-
out requiring special access to silo-ed data from AdTech
delivery channels, Telcos, marketing campaigns, or other
gatekeepers of such information that, generally speaking,
have no incentive to make it public.
Simplicity: The detection method should be as simple as
possible, so that it can be implemented as a distributed system
with most of the functionality and code running on the end-
user device (browser).
Real time operation: A user should be able to request au-
diting of a particular ad appearing in his browser, and the
system should respond within at most few seconds.
Scalability: The detection method should be able to handle
a large number of users (in the order of tens of thousands)
without special requirements on the back-end, including
CPU load, memory, storage, and bandwidth consumption.
Resource consumption must be limited to “control plane”
rather than “data plane” tasks, to make the method scale.
Ad-fraud avoidance: Differently from previous work [16,
38, 39], the method should avoid fake visits to pages, since
fake visits contribute to fake ad impressions and click-fraud.
Detection of indirect targeting: The detection method
should be able to detect both direct and indirect targeting.
User privacy protection: The method should not jeopar-
dize the privacy of end-users by, e.g., requiring them to share
sensitive data such as their browsing history or ads seen.
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3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
We have obtained ethical approval from our institutions
and the funding agencies to conduct this research. More-
over, we have obtained explicit consent from users, before
installing our extension through the FigureEight platform
interface [26], to collect and process the anonymous data
used in this paper.
4 A COUNT-BASED ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe a count-based algorithm for de-
tecting targeted ads using only frequency counts of impres-
sions seen by users across different domains. The algorithm
is inspired by simple observations on how targeted ads be-
have, namely 1) targeted ads tend to “follow” targeted users
across multiple domains, and 2) targeted ads are seen by
relatively fewer users than non-targeted ads.
4.1 Algorithm description
Our algorithm is simple and is based on the above remarks.
By observation (1), if a given ad α is targeting a specific user
u, that user is likely to encounter α across multiple domains.
Therefore, the algorithm counts the number of different do-
mains (#Domainsu,α ) where user u has seen α , and labels
the ad as targeted if that number crosses a threshold that
we call Domainsth,u . Similarly, by observation (2), if α is tar-
geting u, most likely very few other users will see α during
their browsing activity, i.e., only users that share similar in-
terests with u. Therefore, the algorithm counts the number
of different users (#Usersα ) that have seen α and labels α
as targeted if that number is below the Usersth threshold.
Note that the algorithm annotates an ad as targeted if both
conditions holds.
Given an ad α , the number of domains where a user has
seen α , along with the corresponding Domainsth,u threshold
are dependent on user u and, thus, can be computed locally.
On the other hand, computing the number of different users
that have seen α , as well as the Usersth threshold requires a
global view of the system.
4.2 Algorithm details
Threshold estimation:
A fundamental design choice of our algorithm is how to
compute the Domainsth,u and Usersth thresholds. We empir-
ically evaluated different options based on several moments
of the distributions (the mean, the median, the standard de-
viation, and possible combinations thereof). We eventually
settled for the mean of the distribution since it offered the
best trade-off between accuracy and the data we require
from our users. For the sake of clarity, we do discuss all the
alternatives we have considered but, in Section 7.2.3, we
3
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Figure 1: Architecture overview of the eyeWnder sys-
tem and the information flow between entities.
demonstrate the performance difference for a few of these
options and show why we settle for the mean.
In order to be able to set the Domainsth,u threshold, we re-
quire a minimum amount of information from users. Similar
to [51], we require that users have visited at least 4 domains
that serve ads within the last 7 days. If this minimum require-
ment is not met, our algorithm refrains from making a guess
for lack of sufficient data.
Time-window selection: Our algorithm operates in time
intervals in order to update the Usersth threshold, since users
can continuously receive and report ads during their nor-
mal browsing sessions. We select a time window of one
week based on the following observations. First, users tend
to browse differently during weekdays and weekends [10].
Therefore, we consider a week as a natural time period where
both weekdays and weekend are captured, allowing us to
study users’ behavior in both types of days. Second, we con-
sider how targeted ads behave, which aggressively follow
the user for a few days and gradually fade-out over time.
Thus, a window of seven days is sufficiently large to capture
targeting and allows to collect enough historical information
for the algorithm to operate. In fact, we directly contacted
4 large DSP platforms and confirmed that the majority of
ad-campaigns they serve last a week or more. Note that the
Domainsth,u threshold is per individual user, thus, can be
updated in real-time within each user’s browser.
5 THE EYEWNDER SYSTEM
In this section, we describe the high level components of the
system and the information flows between them.
The high level architecture of eyeWnder is depicted in Fig-
ure 1. The system consists of four components: the browser
extension instances, a back-end server, a centralized data-
base, and a crawler server.
Browser extension: The extension performs the following
functions: (1) Collects information about the ads rendered
to the user. (2) Reports information to the back-end server
(Figure 1, arrow 1) through the privacy-preserving protocol
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of Section 6. (3) Classifies ads as targeted or non-targeted,
by leveraging the algorithm of Section 4.1.
The actual algorithm that classifies ads as targeted vs.
non-targeted consists of just a few lines of JavaScript code.
Identifying and collecting info about ads is more involved.
Indeed, different ad delivery channels use a multitude of
techniques for delivering display ads. Several of them go
at great lengths to make programmatic detection of their
code difficult, in an attempt to evade ad-blocking software.
Our extension runs an ad-detection algorithm to automati-
cally detect ads within a page, and a landing page detection
algorithm to infer the pages where ads lead once clicked.
Our ad-detection algorithm is similar to the one of AdBlock-
Plus [2]. Our goal, however, is just to analyze an ad, and not
to block it.
In order to avoid click-fraud, the landing page detection
algorithm does not click on the ad, but rather applies a series
of heuristics to discover the landing URL. In particular, the
algorithm examines <a> HTML tags to extract the URL from
the href field; alternatively, the algorithm looks for onclick
events and extracts the URL if it exists3. In case of JavaScript
code, we run a regex to detect any URL-like strings within the
script text. In all the above cases, if the detection algorithm
finds a URL that does not belong to well-known ad networks,
we consider the URL as the ad landing page. Otherwise, we
refrain from resolving the URL in order to avoid click-fraud.
A similar technique was used in [34, 46]. In case of ads with
randomized landing page URLs (e.g., malicious ads [53] or
customized dynamic ads [5]), we use the ad content (i.e., the
image URL, etc.) to uniquely identify the same advertisement
across different impressions. To identify ad networks that
use randomized landing page URLs we use the methodology
described in [15].
Back-end server: The server maintains the #Usersα coun-
ters and computes the corresponding Usersth threshold. By
leveraging the privacy-preserving protocol of Section 6, the
server receives blinded reports from the extensions, aggre-
gates them, and extracts an estimate of the number of users
that have seen an ad—thereby computing the #Usersα coun-
ters. The server also computes the Usersth threshold by apply-
ing the methodology of Section 4.2; the computed threshold
is then distributed to clients (Figure 1, arrow 5).
Database: We use MySQL to store system metadata, such
as, active users within the system, historic anonymized data
reported by users, etc.(Figure 1, arrow 2). We also store ag-
gregated data that we need for evaluation purposes.
Crawler server: This component is used only for evaluation
purposes, and is responsible for collecting ad-related data on
specific webpages. The crawler is controlled by the back-end
3In some cases the onclick event is redirected to a JavaScript function
instead of a URL redirection.
server and can be instructed to visit specific websites upon
request (Figure 1, arrow 3). Specifically, the crawler server
visits audited pages to collect ads with a clear browsing pro-
file (empty browser cache and an empty set of cookies). These
ads are then used for deciding whether eyeWnder has indeed
classified accurately an ad as targeted (in which case the
crawler should not encounter it during a visit). The crawler
can launch multiple instances of a clean profile browser with
the eyeWnder extension installed, and store the detected ads
directly into the database (Figure 1, arrow 4).
6 PRIVACY PRESERVING PROTOCOL
In this section, we detail a privacy-preserving protocol that
allows the back-end server to compute the #Usersα counters
while clients keep the ads they have seen private.
We leverage techniques used inmany proposals for privacy-
preserving aggregated statistics [18, 36, 41]. The basic idea
is that each user blinds his report before sending it to the
server. Blinding factors are agreed upon by all users and are
such that if the server aggregates all reports, the blinding
cancels out and the aggregate statistic (e.g., the sum of all
reports) becomes available to the server. In a nutshell, one
can think of the blinding factors as additive random shares
of 0. If users report a vector of values, they should compute
separate blindings for each position of the vector. One fun-
damental assumption underlying the design just described is
that all parties in the system (i.e., users and the server) can
enumerate the whole set of elements to be reported. In our
scenario, this set—we denote it byA—includes all ads seen by
at least one of our users. Therefore, its size may be large and,
most importantly, users may not be able to enumerate it. For
example, user Alice may not know what ads have been seen
by user Bob. In such settings, one could use synopsis data
structures for multi-sets that admit aggregation. For example
count-min-sketches [29] (CMS) or spectral bloom filters [19]
can be used. In this work, we use CMS as they allow us to
bound the probability of error, as well as the error itself.
6.1 Count-min-sketch
A CMS X is a bi-dimensional array with d = ⌈lnT /δ⌉ rows
andw = ⌈e/ϵ⌉ columns, where T is the number of elements
to be counted. All the cells of the sketch are initialized to 0
and d pairwise-independent hash functions {hj : {0, 1}∗ →
[w]}1≤j≤d are chosen.
The encoding of an elementxi is done by calling X.update(xi)
that increments X [j,hj (xi )] by 1, for 1 ≤ j ≤ d .
The estimated frequency c¯xi of element xi is retrieved by
calling X.query(xi) that outputs minj X [j,hj (xi )] such that:
(1) cxi ≤ c¯xi
(2) c¯xi ≤ cxi + ϵ
∑
j=1..T cx j with probability 1 − δ
where cxi is the true frequency of element xi .
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In eyeWnder, each user encodes the set of ads he has seen
in a CMS data structure, and blinds each cell before sending
it to the server. The server aggregates all CMSes so that all
blindings cancel out, and obtains the aggregate CMS encod-
ing the multi-set of ads seen across all users. If users share
an additive random share of 0 for each cell of the CMS, this
design allows for a privacy-preserving aggregate statistics
framework for scenarios where the set of elements to be
counted is (a) large and (b) not enumerable by each party.
This design is similar to the one shown in [41], that in turn,
extends techniques presented in [36]. However, the clients
in [41] can enumerate the set of elements to be reported and,
therefore, [41] presents a less challenging scenario.
We also face an additional challenge, that, to the best of
our knowledge, has not been addressed by existing privacy-
preserving aggregate statistic techniques. Data structures
like spectral bloom filters or CMS allow to query for the
estimate frequency of a given element x . That is, the querier
(i.e., our server) must enumerate all the ads encoded in the
aggregate CMS, in order to learn the distribution of ads as
seen by users. Of course, the server cannot do so and our
privacy goal forbids clients from sending the URLs of the
ads to the server. We overcome this problem as follows.
We map the URL of an ad ID in [1, |A|] by means of a
pseudo-random function (PRF). The latter is keyed to pre-
vent the server from computing the mapping on its own.
In particular, given an ad URL x , its ad ID is computed as
y = F (k,x) where F is a PRF and k is a cryptographic key.
For each ad seen by a user, the extension computes the corre-
sponding ad ID and encodes it in the CMS. Note that without
knowledge of k , it is not possible to relate ad URL x to its
identifier y.
Rather than hard-coding the keyk in the extension, we bor-
row from previous research on Oblivious Pseudo-Random
Function (OPRF) [27] and introduce an additional server
to help clients mapping ad URLs to ad IDs. The oprf-server
holds the secret key k and aids clients to computey = F (k,x)
for a given ad URL x . As the name suggests, the server is
“oblivious” to the input of the PRF so that x remains pri-
vate to the user.4 While such a design choice requires an
additional server, we note that previous work uses a simi-
lar approach in order to improve the overall security of an
application [24, 35]. In a real-world deployment, the oprf-
server may be instantiated by already-deployed trusted-third
parties such as certification authorities, EFF, etc.
In practice, we have to (over)estimate |A| in order to mini-
mize collisions when mapping an ad URL to an ad ID. How-
ever, by overestimating |A|, the server is likely to query the
4We note that in order to avoid a single point of failure, mapping function
can be distributed to multiple servers by defining F as the XOR of the output
of multiple OPRFs, each computed with its own secret key.
CMS for ad IDs that correspond to none of the encoded ads
(i.e., a false positive). Nevertheless, later we show that a CMS
is robust to false positives by design.
In the following, we provide details of the protocol.
Blinding factors:We borrow from Kursawe et al. [36] who
have shown how a set of users can agree on random shares
of 0. In particular, let N be the number of users and M be
the number of elements to be blinded (e.g., the number of
cells in a CMS). Also, denote by xi , y = дxi , the private and
public key of user ui , respectively. Here, д is a generator
of a cyclic group G of order q, where Computational Diffie
Hellman is hard. Assume that the public key of each user is
available to all other users in the system, e.g., by means of a
public bulletin board like an online forum5. At round s , user
ui generates a blinding factor for them-th cell as:
bi [m] =
N∑
j=1, j,i
H (yxij | |m | |s) · (−1)i>j
where (−1)i>j is equal to 1 if i > j, or to −1 otherwise. Note
that each user can locally compute his blinding factors by
simply using the public keys of all other users. Note also that
for anym, we have
∑N
i=1 bi [m] = 0, i.e., bi [m] is an additive
random share of 0.
OPRF:We leverage the RSA-based OPRF in [33]. Given an
RSA triple (N ,d, e) where N is the product of two distinct
primes of sufficient length and d, e ∈ Z ∗ϕ (N ) are such that
ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N ), the PRF on input x is defined asG(H (x)d )
where H : {0, 1}∗ → ZN is a hash function mapping ar-
bitrary strings to elements of ZN , and G : ZN → {0, 1}l
H : {0, 1}∗ → ZN is a hash function mapping elements of
ZN to strings of arbitrary length l . The oprf-server gener-
ates the RSA triple (via a suitable key-generation algorithm)
and publishes N , e while keeps d private. Given an ad URL
x , the client issues a request as x ′ = H (x)r e . That is, the
client maps x to ZN and blinds the result by multiplying it
with a random group element r raised to the e-th power. The
server “signs” the request by computing y = (x ′)d . Finally,
the server recovers y ′ = yr and outputs y = G(y ′). Note that
y ′ = yr =
(x ′)d
r =
(H (x )r e )d
r =
H (x )d r ed
r = H (x)d since ed = 1
mod ϕ(N ). The protocol guarantees that the server learns
nothing about x whereas the client learns nothing about d ,
and it is a PRF under the one-more RSA assumption [33].
CMS computation: User ui starts with an empty CMS Xi .
For each newly received ad x , the user engages in an OPRF
protocol with the oprf-server to obtain the corresponding
ad ID y, and encodes y in the CMS by calling Xi .update(y).
When asked to report its CMS, the user blinds each cell
of Xi with the blindings computed as shown above. That
is, the client computes the blinded CMS Xˆi by computing
5The board may be as well hosted at the back-end server.
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Xˆi [j] = Xi [j]+bi [j] for 1 ≤ j ≤ m wherem is the number of
cells in the CMS. Finally, the client sends Xˆi to the server.
Aggregation and unblinding: Finally, the server aggre-
gates all received CMSes by computingX =
∑
i Xˆi where the
sum is cell-wise and, for each ad ID i ∈ {1, . . . |A|} it obtains
the estimated frequency by querying X.query(i).
Fault-tolerance: Our aggregation technique requires that
all users report their blinded CMSes, so that the server can
aggregate them and cancel out the blindings. If a user fails
to report its CMS, aggregation of the remaining ones at the
server results in a CMS with random noise in each of its
cells. In order to tolerate missing reports, the server and
the clients who have sent their reports must go through an
additional round of interaction to “adjust” their blindings and
cater for the blindings of the non-reporting clients (see [41]).
The protocol takes only two rounds—one where the server
reports the list of “missing” clients and another round where
the clients send their CMSes obfuscated with the updated
blinding factors.
Security: The security of our scheme follows from the secu-
rity of the protocol to compute blindings proposed in [36].
We tweak the protocol by using an OPRF to map ad URLs to
a set that is enumerable by the server. By the security provi-
sions of the OPRF protocol, given an ad ID y, it is impossible
to retrieve its original URL without knowledge of the key
held by the oprf-server.
We stress that our protocol remains secure against an
honest-but-curious server, and this is an assumption com-
mon to many other systems that address privacy issues when
computing statistics on crowdsourced data [18, 36, 41].
7 EVALUATION
In this section, we first evaluate the overhead of our privacy
preserving protocol. Second, we present a controlled simu-
lation study to assess the robustness of our algorithm and
the effect of key parameters on its performance. Third, we
present a live validation of the entire system with real ads
and the 100 real users recruited via FigureEight [26].
7.1 Performance and overhead of the
privacy preserving protocol
First, we assess the communication overhead due to the CMS
and compare it with the average communication overhead if
clients were to upload their contributions in cleartext. We
fix δ and ϵ to 0.001 and assume the size of a cell in the CMS
to be 4 bytes. The size in bytes of the CMS totals to 185,
196, and 207KB, for an input size6 of 10k, 50k, and 100k,
respectively. If users were to report their contribution in
cleartext, each user would simply report a vector of URLs.
Since our dataset suggests that users see 35 unique ads on
6The number of ads to be counted.
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Figure 2: The effect of the privacy preserving protocol
on the computation of the #User distribution and its
threshold for three different weeks.
average, the communication overhead for the average user
amounts to roughly 3.5KB (assuming 100-characters URLs
using Unicode encoding). Nevertheless, some users with a
large number of ads to report can see their communication
overhead rise up to hundreds of KB (some users in our dataset
reported around 250 unique ads).
Next, we assess the communication and computation over-
head required to compute the blinding factors. Exchanged
data between the server and a client amount to 0.38MB and
1.9MB for 10k and 50k users, respectively. The computation
time at the client totals 30 seconds for 1k users and a sketch
of size 5k. Our results are in line with results reported in [41].
We stress that both operations are carried out once per week
and can run in the background.
Also, the time to map the URL of an ad to its ID, using the
oprf-server, is always less than 500ms and requires exchang-
ing two group elements (e.g., 1024 bits each). We stress that
the mapping is done once per (unique) ad. It can be carried
out as ads are received and results can be stored locally so
that they are available when the CMS must be computed.
Finally, we empirically show the effect of the privacy pre-
serving protocol on the computation of the #Userα distri-
bution and its threshold. Figure 2 compares the distribu-
tion computed with cleartext reports versus the distribution
computed using the privacy-preserving protocol based on
(blinded) CMSes. The figure shows the difference using data
from three different weeks in our dataset. Furthermore, the
figure reports the threshold value computed on cleartext
data, and the threshold value computed on the outcome of
the privacy-preserving protocol. The latter leads to a slightly
higher threshold and this is due to the collisions that may
happen when mapping ad URLs to ad identifiers.
To sum up, the overhead due to privacy-preserving proto-
col does not impose an unbearable toll on users. The protocol
to map ad URLs to identifiers is very lightweight and the
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mapping is carried out as new ads are encountered. The
protocol to report the CMS requires a few (i.e.2 or 3) MB of
data to be exchanged, assuming 50k users. This is done once
per week and the communication complexity scales linearly
with the number of users. Further, the error on the estimated
distribution due to the privacy-preserving protocol is small
as shown in Figure 2.
7.2 Controlled simulation study
The count-based algorithm of Section 4.1 and its automated
parameter tuning described in Section 4.2 can lead to false
negatives, i.e., targeted ads classified as non-targeted, and
false positives, i.e., non-targeted ones classified as targeted.
In this section, we study the circumstances and the frequency
of such misclassification via controlled simulation experi-
ments. Out of the two metrics, the most important are the
false positives. This has to do with a major use case for eye-
Wnder, which is to report illegal targeting, as explained in
the introduction. Therefore, when eyeWnder classifies an ad
as targeted we want this to be precise with high probability
so that investigations are not triggered by mistake. On the
other hand, failing to detect a targeted ad is relatively less
important since no investigation is launched in this case.
7.2.1 False negatives. As described earlier, our algorithm
uses the fact that the same ad “follows” a user across multiple
domains as an indication of targeting. But how intense should
this following be before our algorithm has a chance to detect
it? If a targeted ad appears only once, then certainly it is
indistinguishable from any non-targeted ads. Considering
the other extreme, if it appears in all the pages visited by
a user, then it obviously becomes easy to detect. Next, we
study the effect of the Frequency Cap i.e., the number of
repetitions (or re-appearances) of a targeted ad on the ability
of our algorithm to detect and classify it correctly. Notice
that this parameter is not known to us, nor uniform across
advertisers and therefore we study its effect in our simulation
model by assigning to it different values. The Frequency Cap
is used by advertisers to avoid annoying targeted users with
too many repetitions of the same ad. In our validation study
appearing later in Section 7.3we demonstrate that our system
is indeed robust to the magnitude of values used in practice,
but remaining unknown to us.
7.2.2 False positives. The same ad can be encountered in
multiple websites without being targeted. Such is the case,
for example, of large-scale “brand awareness” campaigns
paid by large corporations to display their offering in many
mainstream and even niche websites without targeting any
particular individual. Such ads will appear to be chasing a
user across websites, when in reality they are not. Of course,
our algorithm also checks to see that the ad is not seen by
Table 1: Simulation configuration parameters
Variable name Value
Number of users 500
Number of websites 1000
Average user visits 138
Average ads per website 20
Percentage of targeted ads 0.1
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Figure 3: False Negatives % Vs. Frequency Cap using
two different thresholds (Mean, Mean+Median) for
both variables (#Usersα , #Domainsu,a)
many other users of eyeWnder, but non uniform user interests
can lead to misclassification as shown next.
7.2.3 Simulation results. We have built a custom simula-
tor, based on [14], capable of simulating users, websites, and
ad campaigns. The main parameters of the simulator and
pre-set values for our basic configuration, are depicted in
Table 1.
Figure 3 shows that even few repetitions of a targeted ad
make it detectable by our algorithm with high probability.
Setting the Usersth and Domainsth,u thresholds according
to the Mean value of the corresponding counters (see Sec-
tion 4.2) brings false negatives to below 30% with just 6-7
repetitions of an ad. Using as threshold the Mean+Median
value requires a higher number of repetitions for detection
but drops false negative even further to 10%. Our experi-
ments with real users in the next section are in agreement
with these results. In those experiments we set the thresholds
using Mean to make sure we can have detection even with a
smaller number of repetitions for a targeted ad.
Regarding false positives, we have run several different
simulations in which a subset of users visits a subset of sites
that happen to be running large static campaigns. These
users get to see the same ad in different websites not because
they are being targeted but because the ad happens to be
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in all the websites they visit. If the remaining users (the
majority) visits different websites, then misclassification may
appear for the initial subset of users. Still, this happens with
probability below 2% in more than 30 different parameter
configurations that we have tried. This result is also validated
by our experiments with real users. False positives can be
further reduced by grouping users in more homogeneous
groups in terms of browsing patterns (e.g., geographically
or based on age group, etc.).
7.3 Live validation of eyeWnder
Our simulation results have shown that when eyeWnder clas-
sifies an ad as targeted then this is accurate with very high
probability (false positives <2%), whereas when it classifies
an ad as non-targeted the accuracy is again high (false nega-
tives 10-20%). In this section we want to validate the above
results with a live experiment involving real users and cam-
paigns. This is inherently difficult due to the lack of publicly
available ground truth about which ads are targeted and
which not (see Requirements in Section 2.2). The situation
becomes even more challenging when the evaluation has to
be performed for a system used by real end-users (as opposed
to offline evaluation based on network traces), over a variety
of ad delivery channels (as opposed to a single channel, e.g.,
facebook ads [6, 48, 54]). Still in this section we perform such
a live validation and show that it leads to consistent results
with those of our simulation study.
7.3.1 Datasets. We use three different datasets. The first
dataset is created with the help of a crowdsourcing platform
named FigureEight [26]. We collected data during three con-
secutive weeks from a population of 100 users with varying
level of activity. The dataset includes in total 6743 ads. We
call this dataset the “eyeWnder dataset” and we use it as input
to the count-based algorithm that classifies the collected ads.
In addition, we also ask the FigureEight users to label the
ads that they receive as targeted or not. For this purpose, we
instruct the users to provide labels to all the ads they receive
while surfing the web. We call this subset of labeled ads the
“F8 dataset”.
The last dataset we use is collected by the crawler during
the same three weeks. It includes several visits and ad col-
lections to any website in which eyeWnder has classified an
ad7. We call this dataset, “CR dataset” and use it to identify
statically placed ads as done in [16, 46].
7.3.2 Methodology. Figure 4 presents the work-flow of
our evaluation methodology. The idea is to compare the
classification derived by eyeWnder against the classification
7Note that for evaluation we are using full information on our test users
after having been granted full consent. The privacy preserving protocol is
developed for the actual operation of the system beyond evaluation.
from the crawled dataset (denoted by CR in the figure), the
classification from a content-based detection heuristic (CB)8,
and the classification from FigureEight users (F8). These
comparisons yield False Positives (FP), False Negatives (FN),
True Positives (TP), True Negatives (TN), as well as UN-
KNOWN rates. As we will explain shortly, results derived
by comparing against the crawler are correct with high prob-
ability (namely FP(CR), TN(CR)). Results derived by com-
paring against the content-based heuristic or FigureEight
are likely correct (namely TP(CB), FN(CB), TP(F8), TN(F8),
FP(F8), FN(F8)). The justification for the above is that the
content-based heuristic and FigureEight are themselves sub-
jective means of classifying an ad. Users have limitations in
detecting bias or discrimination [47], whereas the content-
based heuristic is just another heuristic whose validation
faces the same challenges with the validation of eyeWnder.
Since, however, the heuristic is a reasonable one, and the
users have been selected carefully, we assume that their clas-
sifications will be more right than wrong. Ads falling under
UNKNOWN are ads for which it is impossible to assess pre-
cision by the previous means. We handle them separately in
Section 7.3.3. Next, we traverse the evaluation flow-chart of
Figure 4 from top to bottom, starting from the right branch.
Ads classified as targeted: If an ad is classified as targeted
by eyeWnder, we check to see if the crawler happens to see
the same ad. If this happens, then we have a false positive
with high probability, since targeted ads should not be en-
countered by a crawler having empty browsing history.
If the crawler does not see the ad, thenwe proceed to check
if the ad shares any semantic overlap with the user, using the
methodology described in [45]. If it does, then, and only then,
we check to see if the content-based heuristic also classifies
it as targeted. We do this check in order to identify the set of
ads in which eyeWnder and the content-based heuristic have
a chance to agree. Such ads can only be Direct targeted ads
because the content-based heuristic can only detect those
(see Section 2.1). In our evaluation, we check for semantic
overlap using the content-based heuristic which implies that
if the ad has semantic overlap with the user, eyeWnder and
the content based heuristic will agree by default9 yielding a
likely true positive.
8We have adapted the methodology of [16] to operate with real users instead
of personas. For each user, we have selected the most significant categories
of the pages he visits to create his profile. We used categories appearing at
least T times in different websites. We have used T = 20 since in the context
of this paper we are seeking precision rather than recall. We classify an
ad as targeted if the main category of its landing page (as obtained from
AdWords) matches one of the categories in the user profile.
9It might appear as redundant to check both for semantic overlap and
agreement with the content-based heuristic, since we use the latter also for
semantic overlap. We have kept both stages for generality, since semantic
overlap could be checked with alternative methods than our content-based
heuristic.
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Figure 4: The evaluation tree for precision performance of the eyeWnder classification of targeted ads.
If an ad does not share semantic overlap with the user,
we check to see if FigureEight users have tagged it. Notice
here that FigureEight users have classified only a subset
of the ads that they have seen. If they have not provided a
classification, then the ad is added to UNKNOWN. Otherwise,
if their classification agrees with eyeWnder, we have a likely
true positive, else a likely false positive.
Ads classified as non-targeted: If an ad that eyeWnder
classifies as non-targeted is seen by the crawler, then this
produces a true negative. If the ad has semantic overlap
with the user, then, as explained before, the content-based
heuristic will classify it as targeted, thereby yielding a likely
false negative for eyeWnder. If the ad does not have semantic
overlap with the user, we check to see if FigureEight users
have classified it. If they have not, it goes to UNKNOWN. If
they have classified as targeted, it produces a false negative
for eyeWnder. If they have classified it as non-targeted, then
we have a likely true negative for eyeWnder.
7.3.3 Dealing with the unknown. Due to the lack of ground
truth, a high rate of classified ads (148 targeted and 4219 non-
targeted) have ended up in the two UNKNOWN groups of
Figure 4, for which we cannot evaluate precision using the
crawler, the content-based heuristic or FigureEight. In this
section, we perform extra analysis to resolve non-targeted
UNKNOWNs into likely-TN or likely-FN, and the targeted
UNKNOWNs into likely-TP or likely-FP.
– Non-targeted UNKNOWN: In this case, both count-based
and content-based classification have identified these ads as
non-targeted. However, these ads were not manually tagged
by FigureEight users. Hence, we select a random set of 200
of these ads and manually inspect them. In particular, we
consider the profile of the user receiving the ad, in order to
manually determine if the ad is targeting such a profile.
– Targeted UNKNOWN: This group includes 148 ads that eye-
Wnder classified as targeted, but CB and FigureEight users
did not. Hence, they may be either FP or some form of tar-
geting (e.g., indirect) that escapes CB or FigureEight users. A
preliminary manual inspection showed that several of them
seemed to be retargeted ads [9]. To verify this, we manually
visited the landing page associated to each ad, and afterwards
we visited some of the domains where the ad re-appeared
according to our dataset. The experiment was set up for
testing the repeatability of the suspected retargeting. When
the experiment led to retargeting, it meant that our initial
guess was correct, and we considered the classification to be
a likely TP.
For the remaining ads, we evaluated if they could be in-
direct OBA ads. To this end, we performed a correlation
analysis between the topics of the ad’s landing page and the
profiles of the users receiving that ad. If there exists statis-
tically significant correlation between some of the ad’s and
the user’s topics, but these topics are not semantically over-
lapping, then we interpret it as likely indirect OBA ad, and
the classification is a likely TP. Some examples of ads that we
identified as indirect OBA are the following: (1) Male users
who exhibit interest in computers, electronics, cars, etc., but
receiving ads from a dating website (perhaps a classic indi-
rect targeting of single male users). (2) Users with interest
in computers, electronics, and programming, but receiving
ads from KFC, a famous fast food restaurant. (3) Users with
interest in websites related to beauty products, fitness, body
care, etc., receiving ads related to seafood. Finally (4) users
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who showed interest in governmental websites, internet ser-
vices, insurance services, etc., receiving ads related to real
estate and housing.
7.3.4 Results. The rates in Figure 4 along with the results
from our analysis of unknown ads reveal that the overall
rate of likely TPs is 78%. From these, 10% have been identi-
fied by CB or FigureEight users. The rest are associated to
retargeting or indirect OBA. Our analysis also reveals a TN
rate of 87%. In particular, 27% are highly probable TNs, since
these ads have been marked as non-targeted by both, eyeWn-
der and the crawler. The remaining 60% are likely TNs. This
percentage has been derived from our manual inspection of
non-targeted UNKNOWN.
Based on these results, we claim that our method meets
the high precision requirement defined in Section 2, which
guarantees that, for instance, users willing to report a privacy
incident related to an ad have high confidence that the ad is
indeed targeted.
We acknowledge that there is still room for improvement,
since, as the evaluation shows, eyeWnder sometimes fails
to detect ads classified as targeted by CB (416) or F8 (91).
This is mainly due to two factors. First, as we further dis-
cuss in Section 10, we have evaluated eyeWnder with just a
few users, which is close to a worst-case analysis given the
crowdsourced nature of the system. Second, eyeWnder has
been configured to maximize the precision rather than recall
for reasons discussed in Section 2. We are confident that with
a bigger dataset, our existing count-based detection would
perform better. We could also come up with more elaborate
heuristics to improve performance. Our objective in this pa-
per, however, is to make the point that even with few users,
simple count-based detection yields precise classification for
both directly and indirectly targeted ads.
Evading detection of targeted ads: Finally, in this para-
graph we discuss the situations where advertisers are in-
tentionally trying to evade the detection of targeted ads.
Our system is robust to that since there is a lot of inherent
randomness in the current way ads are delivered, yet eye-
Wnder identifies such ads with good accuracy even with few
hundreds of users. For an adversary to defeat detection it
will have to effectively give up targeting or do it very mildly
which would, effectively, go against the very idea of targeting
and his business model.
8 SOCIO-ECONOMIC BIASES
In this section, we leverage the social, economic and demo-
graphic information we have from the volunteers and the
datasets of Section 7.3.1, to look for potential socio-economic
biases of ad targeting.
Table 2: Logistic regression modeling for targeted ads
Variable OR SE Z-val P>|z| 95% CI
Gen
der female 0.255 0.407 -3.356 8e-4
∗∗∗∗ 0.107-0.539
male 0.174 0.383 -4.566 5e-6∗∗∗∗ 0.076-0.348
Inco
me
30k-60k 1.446 0.145 2.538 0.0111∗∗ 1.088-1.924
60k-90k 1.521 0.187 2.249 0.0245∗∗ 1.052-2.187
90k-... 0.525 0.343 -1.878 0.0603∗ 0.257-0.996
Age
20-30 1.031 0.407 0.075 0.9404 0.488-2.450
30-40 1.428 0.405 0.880 0.3790 0.679-3.388
40-50 1.964 0.422 1.599 0.1098 0.899-4.788
50-60 0.745 0.489 -0.601 0.5475 0.291-2.022
60-70 2.654 0.477 2.044 0.0409∗∗ 1.069-7.087
OR: Odds Ratio, SE: Standard Error, CI: Confidence Interval
∗∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
8.1 Logistic regression analysis
The demographic data provided by our volunteers include
information such as gender (G), age (A), income level (L),
employment status (E), etc. We want to investigate these
independent, nominal and ordinal factors, and how they
associate with the type of advertisement delivered to the
participating users. In practice, the type of ad is the depen-
dent variable (D) in our model, receiving a binary status of
“static” or “targeted” advertisement. Using these input data,
we perform a binomial logistic regression on the 4 indepen-
dent variables to model the 1 dependent variable, in the form:
D ∼ G +A + L + E.
In reality, we tested several configurations for the model,
including pairwise interactions between all independent fac-
tors, as well as removing incrementally each one of them to
test if the model improved its predictive performance. In fact,
in the case of “employment status”, it was removed from the
model as it was deemed non-useful with an anova likelihood
ratio test, with non-significant impact in the final produced
model. Here, we only report the experimental setup that
yielded a logistic regression model with most statistically
significant results, in form: D ∼ G +A+L, considering 0-30k
and 1-20 the base levels for income and age, respectively.
8.2 Findings
The results of the logistic regression are shown in Table 2.
Also, in Figure 5 we plot the effects of the three variables and
all their corresponding levels, with respect to the expected
probability for a user to receive targeted ads. From these
results, we make the following observations:
– Gender bias: From our analysis, we find statistically signifi-
cant effect on the factor of gender. In particular, women are
more likely to be targeted by advertisers than men, and this
result is significant at p < 0.001.
– Economic bias: Our results show that as the income level of
a user increases from 30k to 60k , and from 60k to 90k euros,
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Figure 5: Predicted probability for a targeted advertise-
ment to be delivered to a user, vs. three independent
variables with statistically significant levels.
Table 3: Comparison of characteristics of main tar-
geted ad detection solutions.
[20] [7] [40] [16] [38] [39] [46] eyeWnder
Fake Impressions † † † † † † †
Click-fraud † † *
Privacy-preserving ✓
Real-users ✓ ✓
Personas • • • • • •
Operates in Real-time ✓ ✓
High scalability ✓ ✓
Operates Offline † † † † † †
Topic-based • • • •
Correlation-based • • •
Count-based •
† Negative,✓ Positive, • Neutral, * Unspecified - (Within the context of this work)
he or she is more likely to be targeted by advertisers, and
this is statistically significant at p < 0.05. However, when
the income level becomes too high (i.e., above 90k euros),
the expected probability of targeted advertising is reduced.
We conjecture that advertisers profile users to construct
economic capacities for each one, and adjust their targeting
campaigns accordingly to optimize click-through and sale
rates. Online advertisements targeting very wealthy users
may have proven to be less profitable than other income
brackets, and thus, such users are less targeted.
– Age bias: From the odds ratio scores, it appears that increas-
ingly older users are more probable to be targeted by adver-
tisers. However, some of the age brackets are less populated
by ads and users and thus, our results are not statistically
significant, but only demonstrate a consistent trend.
9 RELATEDWORK
Table 3 summarizes and compares existing proposals for
detecting targeted advertisements. From a methodological
view, these solutions can be grouped into topic-based [7, 16,
40, 46], and correlation-based detection [20, 38, 39].
Topic-based solutions perform content-based analysis to
extract the relevant topics on a user’s browsing history and
the ads he receives. Then, using different heuristics and statis-
tical means, targeted ads are identified as those having topics
that share some semantic overlap with the user’s browsing
history. Topic-based detection could, in principle, be applied
to real users, as we have done for evaluation purposes in
Section 7. Existing work, however, has only used it in con-
junction with artificially constructed personas, i.e., robots
that browse the web imitating very specific (single-topic)
demographic groups [7, 16], or to emulate real-users offline
using click-streams [40].
The only topic-based solution meant to be used by real
users is MyAdchoice [46], which has been implemented in
the form of a browser extension. This extension is available
only under request, and based on the information reported
in the paper, it has been only used in a beta-testing phase
by few tens of friends and colleagues. Independently of the
specific pros and cons of individual solutions, topic-based
detection presents some common limitations. The most im-
portant being that it can only detect direct interest-based
targeted advertising. It is unable to detect other forms of
targeting based on demographic or geographic parameters,
as well as indirect targeting (see Section 2.1 for definitions).
Correlation-based solutions treat the online advertising
ecosystem as a blackbox and apply machine learning and sta-
tistical methods to detect correlations between the browsing
behavior and other characteristics of a user (OS, device type,
location, etc.) and the ads he sees. For instance, XRay [38]
and Sunlight [39] create for each persona several shadow ac-
counts. Each shadow account performs a subset of the actions
performed by the original persona. By analyzing the common
actions performed by shadow accounts receiving the same
reaction from the ecosystem (i.e., the same ad), the authors
can infer the cause of a targeting event. AdFisher [20] uses
similar concepts to find discrimination practices, for instance,
in the ads shown to men vs. women. As with topic-based de-
tection, this technique presents important challenges related
to scalability and practical implementation. Moreover, they
are not suitable for real-time targeting detection. With the
exception of [46], no previous work has been implemented
as a tool for end-users. Most of them, including [46], rely
on content-based analysis, thereby suffering from scalability
issues and inability to detect indirect targeting.
Parallel to efforts from the research community, the Eu-
ropean Interactive Digital Advertising Alliance (EDAA) has
developed YourAdChoices [4]. It is a self-regulation program
in which companies that deliver targeted ads voluntarily
add an icon that, if clicked by a user, offers some form of
explanation of why the user received the ad. This technique
scales and works in real time. It only works, however, with
companies participating in the program. It also assumes full
trust on the reported explanations, something that has been
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challenged by recent works [20]. eyeWnder offers the oppor-
tunity to conduct independent audits, which are useful for
end-users, data protection authorities, as well as for the cred-
ibility of ad-choices and related self-regulation initiatives.
10 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
We have showed that a simple count-based heuristic can de-
tect targeted advertising without having to perform complex
content-based analysis, i.e.without having to understand se-
mantically webpages or received ads. To be able to run such
an algorithm, one needs a crowdsourced database of how
many users have seen each ad. Such a crowdsourced database
can be built efficiently and without jeopardizing user pri-
vacy, i.e., without requiring users to report the actual ads they
have seen, nor the websites where they encountered them.
Our count-based heuristic and privacy preserving crowd-
sourced approach have been implemented in a first of its
kind distributed system called eyeWnder, which allows users
to audit any encountered ad impression in real-time to check
whether it is targeted or not. We have developed a detailed
validation methodology for the difficult problem of assessing
the accuracy of an ad detection method using only publicly
available information.
Crowdsourcing simplifies the ad detection problem. Any
crowdsourcing method, however, has two Achilles’ heels:
privacy risks and bootstrapping its user-base. We have ad-
dressed the first and taken only very preliminary measures
for the second. For example, we circulated it among other
researchers, and enlisting some users for pay. This has per-
mitted us to conduct a preliminary evaluation of eyeWnder
and show that the count-based approach is indeed promis-
ing. Our current effort is to scale up our user-base. To do
so, we will use traditional means, e.g., seeking more expo-
sure through media, or getting help from data protection
authorities to enlist users. Scaling up the user-base will help
us refine our count-based ad detection method, evaluation,
and probably yield many more interesting findings. This,
however, remains a task for future work.
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